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In this paper, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based Sarsa temporal-difference (TD) algorithm is applied to 
search for a unified bidding and operation strategy for a coal-fired power plant with monoethanolamine 
(MEA)-based post-combustion carbon capture under different carbon dioxide (CO2) allowance market con-
ditions. The objective of the decision maker for the power plant is to maximize the discounted cumulative 
profit during the power plant lifetime. Two constraints are considered for the objective formulation. Firstly, 
the tradeoff between the energy-intensive carbon capture and the electricity generation should be made un-
der presumed fixed fuel consumption. Secondly, the CO2 allowances purchased from the CO2 allowance mar-
ket should be approximately equal to the quantity of CO2 emission from power generation. Three case stud-
ies are demonstrated thereafter. In the first case, we show the convergence of the Sarsa TD algorithm and 
find a deterministic optimal bidding and operation strategy. In the second case, compared with the inde-
pendently designed operation and bidding strategies discussed in most of the relevant literature, the Sarsa 
TD-based unified bidding and operation strategy with time-varying flexible market-oriented CO2 capture 
levels is demonstrated to help the power plant decision maker gain a higher discounted cumulative profit. 
In the third case, a competitor operating another power plant identical to the preceding plant is considered 
under the same CO2 allowance market. The competitor also has carbon capture facilities but applies a differ-
ent strategy to earn profits. The discounted cumulative profits of the two power plants are then compared, 
thus exhibiting the competitiveness of the power plant that is using the unified bidding and operation strat-
egy explored by the Sarsa TD algorithm.
© 2017 THE AUTHORS. Published by Elsevier LTD on behalf of the Chinese Academy of Engineering and 
Higher Education Press Limited Company. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the dominant greenhouse gas emitted 
by power plants. Amine-based post-combustion carbon capture is a 
promising technology for large-scale carbon capture, since it permits 
carbon capture to be achieved with a relatively simple retrofit of a 
conventional fossil-fuel power plant [1]. Monoethanolamine (MEA), 
classified as a primary amine, is the most applicable solvent when 
adopting a solvent-based carbon capture strategy because it has a 
fast reaction rate with CO2 as compared with secondary and tertiary 
amines [2]. Previous studies focused on the optimal operation of 
the solvent-based carbon capture process under a specified capture 
level [1,3௅7]. Nonetheless, regeneration of MEA for carbon capture 
is energy-intensive and costly. Operation of the carbon capture pro-
cess with a constant capture level is uneconomical under the CO2 
allowance market, where the settlement price may change for every 
quarter auction. In Refs. [8,9], it was already noted that the CO2 cap-
ture level might change under different CO2 price conditions. Those 
CO2 pricing mechanisms, however, are similar to a carbon tax [10]. 
For a flexible market-oriented CO2 allowance trading mechanism 
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[11–13], the decision maker should decide on the CO2 allowances 
bid from the market. It is imperative to design a unified bidding and 
operation strategy for a power plant with carbon capture in order to 
maximize profits during the life cycle of the plant.
In this paper, we implement the Sarsa temporal-difference (TD) 
algorithm to explore a bidding and operation strategy for the decision 
maker of a specific power plant with solvent-based carbon capture. 
The relationship between bidding and operation is established with a 
holding account of the decision maker under the time-varying allow-
ance market [14]. The performance of the strategy is assessed in terms 
of the discounted cumulative profit—that is, the discounted cash flow 
of the power plant [9]. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
the bidding and operation problem of a coal-fired power plant inte-
grated with solvent-based carbon capture is discussed and formu-
lated, based on a profit model of a coal-fired power plant integrated 
with a carbon capture process that considers the quarter-based CO2 
allowance auctions. In Section 3, the Sarsa TD algorithm is introduced 
and applied to find an optimal solution for the aforementioned inte-
grated system. In Section 4, the results demonstrate that the Sarsa TD 
algorithm can find a solution for the unified bidding and operation 
strategy that maximizes the profits for the specific power plant. Con-
clusions are drawn at the end of the paper.
2. Problem formulation
In this section, a profit model of a coal-fired power plant integrated 
with a carbon capture process is developed and a simplified green-
house gas emission trading system is introduced. An objective func-
tion is then formulated in terms of the discounted cumulative profit 
of the power plant within the lifetime of the plant under the emission 
trading system.
2.1. Development of an MEA-based carbon capture model
The process model for the MEA-based carbon capture process was 
developed in Aspen Plus® [15]. Its physical properties were calculat-
ed using the electrolyte non-random two-liquid (eNRTL) method. 
It was validated using experimental data from pilot plants [16], and 
was scaled up to deal with flue gas equivalent to that discharged 
by a 650 MW coal-fired subcritical power plant. Fig. 1 [6,17] dis-
plays the MEA-based post-combustion carbon capture process 
flow diagram. As shown in the diagram, two absorber columns are 
constructed for the flue gas CO2 absorption [18]; Table 1 shows the 
parameters of absorber and stripper columns. A lean MEA solvent 
stream is divided into two equal parts by Splitter 1 and fed into the 
top of two absorbers. Simultaneously, the flue gas from a power 
plant is divided by Splitter 2 and injected into the bottom of the ab-
sorbers. In the absorber columns, CO2 in the flue gas reacts with the 
MEA solvent automatically. The vapor phase, which has less CO2, is 
released into the atmosphere, while the MEA solvent phase, which 
is rich in CO2, is pumped to the cross heat exchanger and then trans-
ported to the stripper. In the stripper column, CO2 is decomposed 
from the rich MEA solvent, while a lean MEA solvent is regenerated 
and leaves the stripper bottom. This lean MEA solvent is cooled by 
the cross heat exchanger and the downstream cooler, since it should 
achieve a specified temperature target of the inlet lean MEA solvent 
of the two absorbers. In addition, before recycling, MEA and water 
losses are made up using Mixer 3. Eventually, the lean MEA solvent 
is fed back for continuous CO2 absorption. Through the condenser of 
the stripper, a high-concentration CO2 product is ready for compres-
sion and transport.
In Fig. 1, the MEA-based post-combustion carbon capture process 
is controlled by four control loops. A similar control scheme is dis-
cussed in the literature [3,17]. Correspondingly, for the steady-state 
model in Aspen Plus®, we set the design specifications as follows: 
ķ The top stage temperature of the stripper is set at 35 °C by vary-
ing the condenser duty; ĸ the temperature of the lean MEA solvent 
at the top of the absorbers is set at 40 °C by varying the cooler duty; 
Ĺ the lean loading (i.e., the mole ratio between CO2 and MEA in lean 
MEA solvent) of lean MEA solvent is set at around 0.2 mol of CO2 
Fig. 1. The MEA-based post-combustion carbon capture process flow diagram [6,17]. AT: composition transmitter; FT: flow transmitter; TT: temperature transmitter; CC: CO2 
capture level controller; LLC: lean loading controller; TC: temperature controller.
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items in Eq. (1) are summarized below:
 0.25  nFOM ȕ P   (3) 
 /1000 t tVOM į E     (4)
  t tF f H    (5)
where ȕ and į are fixed and variable OM cost coefficients, respec-
tively; f is the fuel cost; and Pn is the power plant nominal capacity. 
These variables are defined in Table 4 [21] with specific units. In 
addition, Et is the electricity output (kW·h·qtr–1) and Ht is the fuel 
consumption (GJ·qtr–1). The revenue from the electricity generation 
of a coal-fired power plant can be written as follows:
  t tR Ȝ E    (6)
where Ȝ is the electricity price in USD·(kW·h)–1, shown in Table 4. 
The profit for the tth quarter can be then derived as follows:
 0.25 /1000
( , , , )
 
          
t t t
t n t t t t
t t t t
P R C
Ȝ E ȕ P į E f H v w
P E H w v
      (7)
where we denote Pt = P (Et, Ht, wt, vt) since the profit is dependent on 
the variables Et, Ht, wt, and vt .
In this paper, the total fuel consumption for power generation 
and carbon capture, Ht, is assumed to be constant. As a result, 
tradeoffs should be made between the electricity output of the main 
power plant and the energy-intensive carbon capture for the inte-
grated carbon capture facilities. For a coal-fired power plant with 
nominal capacity Pn = 650 000 kW, as specified in Table 4, the fuel 
consumption in a quarter can be calculated as follows:
 
6 –1/ 2190 3600 /10 7267999 GJ qtr     t nH P Ș ȗ  (8)
where the value 2190 represents the number of hours in one quar-
ter. The quarterly energy consumption of the carbon capture, Ut, in 
GJ·qtr–1, is constrained by
 
6/ 3600 /10  t t tH U E Ș    (9)
Ut can be related to the corresponding reboiler duty, Qreb(ct), as 
discussed in Section 2.1:
 ( ) 3600 /1000 2190   t reb tU Q c ȗ    (10)
By combining Eqs. (9) and (10), the electricity output Et for the 
per mol of MEA (molCO2·mol
–1
MEA) [18,19] by varying the reboiler heat 
duty; and ĺ the CO2 capture level should be set at a specified value 
within a discrete value set {50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%} by manipulat-
ing the lean MEA flow rate. Note that, in reality, since lean loading is 
difficult to measure, the reboiler temperature is specified by varying 
the heat duty that indicates lean loading.
With the specifications of the absorber and stripper columns 
as shown in Table 1 and the base input settings of the flue gas and 
lean MEA solvent as shown in Table 2, we further manipulate the 
mole flowrate and lean loading of the lean MEA solvent to achieve 
specified CO2 capture levels with the least reboiler duties. Table 3 
summarizes the performance for each operation specification, from 
which we can determine the optimal reboiler duty Qreb (ct) for differ-
ent CO2 capture levels ct in the tth quarter.
2.2. Profit model for coal-fired subcritical power plant
Coal-fired power plants are important elements since they con-
tribute to major energy consumption around the world and release 
the most CO2 of any power generation systems [20]. Therefore, in 
this section, we formulate the quarterly profit for a coal-fired sub-
critical power plant that is integrated with carbon capture. We also 
establish the relationship between the operation specifications and 
the electricity output. According to the US Energy Information Ad-
ministration (EIA) [21], the cost, Ct, of a power plant for the tth quar-
ter in USD per quarter (USD·qtr–1) can be calculated as follows:
    t t t tC FOM VOM F B    (1)
where FOM is the quarterly fixed operation and maintenance (OM) 
cost; VOMt is the quarterly variable OM cost; Ft is the quarterly fuel 
cost; and Bt is the quarterly CO2 bidding cost. According to the Cal-
ifornia CO2 allowance auction mechanism [11], the bidding cost is 
defined as follows:
  t t tB v w    (2)
where vt is the settlement price of CO2 allowances in USD per allow-
ance for a quarterly allowance auction and wt is the winning CO2 al-
lowances of the decision maker for the tth quarter. One CO2 allowance 
permits the release of one metric ton of CO2 by a power plant. Other 
Table 1
Parameters of absorber and stripper columns.
Parameters Absorber Stripper
Packing type Mellapak Mellapak
Dimension 250Y 250Y
Number of columns 2 1
Diameter (m) 16.9 16.9
Packing height (m) 23.5 23.5
Top stage pressure (Pa) 101 325 170 273
Table 2
Material streams of post-combustion carbon capture.
Parameters Flue gas Lean MEA solvent
Mole flow rate (kmol·s–1) 25 —
Temperature (°C) 40 40
Pressure (Pa) 105 117 170 273
Mass fraction MEA 0 0.3098
H2O 0.0964 0.6434
CO2 0.2068 0.0468
N2 0.6703 0
O2 0.0265 0
Table 3
Performance of the MEA-based post-combustion carbon capture process with differ-
ent operation specifications.
Capture level 
Lean MEA flow rate 
(kg·s–1)
Lean loading 
(molCO
2
·mol–1MEA)
Qreb (MWth)
50% 948.8 0.20 293.3
60% 1148.2 0.20 354.5
70% 1350.3 0.20 416.9
80% 1557.3 0.20 480.9
90% 1837.5 0.21 547.3
Table 4
Parameters of a power plant with carbon capture [21].
Parameters Symbol Value Unit
Nominal capacity Pn 650 000 kW
Capacity factor ȗ 0.55 Unitless
Efficiency Ș 38.78 %
Fixed OM coefficient ȕ 80.53 USD·(kW·a)–1
Variable OM coefficient į 9.51 USD·(MW·h)–1
Electricity price Ȝ 0.102 USD·(kW·h)–1
Fuel price f 1.545 USD·GJ–1
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tth quarter can be derived as follows:
 
610 / 3600 [ 7884 ( ) ] ( )     t t reb t tE H Q c ȗ Ș E c    (11) 
which indicates that the capture level ct can uniquely determine the 
electricity output. The quarterly profit of the power plant (Eq. (7)) 
can be simplified as follows:
 ( , ( ), , ) ( , , ) t t t t t t t tP P H E c w v P c w v     (12)
In summary, for a specific coal-fired power plant with CO2 cap-
ture, assuming a fixed amount of fuel to be used and continually 
fixed fuel and electricity prices, its profit Pt for the tth quarter can 
be uniquely determined by the CO2 capture level ct, the winning CO2 
allowances of the decision maker wt purchased from the CO2 auction, 
and the settlement price vt for each CO2 allowance.
2.3. CO2 allowance market
In Section 2.2, although the profit, Pt (Eq. (7)), for one quarter is 
fully defined, only two degrees of freedom, Et and Ht, have been dis-
cussed. The other two degrees of freedom, wt and vt, should be influ-
enced by the CO2 allowance market conditions. A quarterly market 
condition will be fully defined when the bid options (including bid 
quantities q and bid prices p) of all covered or opt-in entities (e.g., 
power generation companies) in the market are submitted to the 
auction operator. The bid quantity and bid price of the entity con-
cerning the decision maker are denoted as q0,t and p0,t, respectively; 
the bid quantities and prices for all the other entities are denoted as 
qi,t and pi,t, respectively, for ię , where ={1, 2, 3, …, I} is the entity 
set of all the covered entities in the allowance market except the 
entity of the decision maker. The operator will then implement the 
sealed bid auction mechanism [14] as follows.
During one quarter, the auction operator will reject unqualified 
bids that violate the purchase limit, holding limit, or bid guarantee 
of the corresponding entity or bidder. Subsequently, the qualified 
bids of all bidders will be considered by descending order in terms 
of bid prices. Beginning with the highest price bid, bidders sub-
mitting bids at each price will be sold CO2 allowances equivalent to 
their bid quantities until one of the following conditions applies: All 
the auctioned allowances, A, in the allowance market are sold out; 
or, the bid price of the next bidder is less than the auction reserve 
price, gt, in USD per allowance [11]. If the auctioned CO2 allowances 
are sold out, the settlement price is the bid price for the last bid 
that is sold with allowances; if the settlement price is equal to 
the reserve price, the sold CO2 allowances are the cumulative bid 
quantities of all the bids with prices above the price of the reserve 
bid. The auction operator can then calculate the winning CO2 allow-
ances of the winning bid of each bidder or entity (e.g., the winning 
CO2 allowance of the decision maker is wt in this paper), the sold 
CO2 allowances ut, and the unified settlement price vt for all entities, 
where
 0, 0, 1, 1, , ,( , , , , ..., , ) t t t t t I t I tw w q p q p q p    (13)  
 0, 0, 1, 1, , ,( , , , , ..., , ) t t t t t I t I tv v q p q p p q   (14)
 
 0, 0, 1, 1, , ,( , , , , ..., , ) t t t t t I t I tu u q p q p q p   (15)
In Eqs. (13), (14), or (15), the decision maker can only determine 
its own bid quantity q0,t and bid price p0,t. The decision maker should 
estimate the bid options for other companies using the historical 
bidding data of other entities, as represented by the probabilities 
shown in Section 2.4.
In this paper, in order to judge whether a bid is qualified or not, 
we only consider the holding limit, hl, of the power plant decision 
maker in the allowances. The purchase limit and bid guarantee are 
omitted for simplicity. The holding limit is the upper limit of a hold-
ing account for an entity that is covered in the allowance markets. 
If the submitted bid quantity, q, of any entity may latently cause its 
holding account CO2 allowances to exceed the holding limit, this 
submitted bid will be an unqualified bid and will be rejected by 
the auction operator. In this paper, the holding account only has an 
analogous functionality of several accounts, as set forth in the Cali-
fornia code of regulations [11]. We assume the following constraints 
for holding account CO2 allowances:
 1 0, d  dt t t lh h q h   (16)
 1 ( ) 0    tt t t th h w e   (17)
where ht+1 is the holding account CO2 allowances at the beginning 
of the (t+1)th quarter auction. Note that if winning CO2 allowances, 
wt, are less than the CO2 emission, et, extra CO2 allowances should be 
surrendered from the holding account; if the winning CO2 allow-
ances are more than the CO2 emission, the redundant winning CO2 
allowances will be reserved in the holding account. The total CO2 al-
lowances accumulated in the holding account for all quarters before 
the tth quarter is denoted as ht. The inequality in Eq. (17) indicates 
that the holding account CO2 allowances, ht, should not be exhaust-
ed; otherwise, extra penalties will be paid due to excess emissions 
without the surrender of allowances. According to the California 
regulations [11], four times the excess emission is set as the compli-
ance obligation for untimely surrender. Additional bidding and trad-
ing mechanisms will be introduced to meet the untimely surrender 
obligation. For brevity, we assume that the penalty of untimely sur-
render is 320 USD for each metric ton of CO2 excess emission, rather 
than the penalty set forth in the California regulations. Therefore, 
the inequality in Eq. (17) is a soft bound. On the other hand, the ine-
quality in Eq. (16) implies that, for any t, the decision maker should 
only submit bid quantity q0,t, which may not potentially cause ht+1 
greater than hl, as mentioned earlier. The variable et represents the 
CO2 emission of the power plant in the tth quarter in t·qtr
–1, which 
can be determined as follows:
 148.6 (1 ) 3600 2190 /1000 ( )     t t te c ȗ e c   (18)
Since ct is the CO2 capture level related to the operation of the 
solvent-based carbon capture process, while wt and q0,t are related 
to the bidding under the CO2 allowance market, the inequalities in 
Eqs. (16) and (17) indicate the latent relationship between bidding 
and operation.
2.4. Objective formulation
In Section 2.2, the profit (Eq. (12)) is expressed by the CO2 capture 
level ct, the winning CO2 allowances of the decision maker wt, and 
the settlement price vt. The capture level, ct, can be arbitrarily deter-
mined by the decision maker, while the winning CO2 allowances, wt, 
and the settlement price, vt, must be determined by bid options of all 
the entities shown in Eqs. (13) and (14). Provided that all the other 
entities have submitted their bid options (i.e., pi,t and qi,t with ię ), 
the decision maker of the power plant with carbon capture only 
needs to determine the operation method, that is, ct, and the bidding 
method, (q0,t, p0,t), for the corresponding profit (Eq. (12)) estimation. 
The unified action is denoted as
 0, 0,( , , ) ( )=  Tt t t t ta c q p s   (19)
where (st) is the discrete action set under state st and is supposed to 
be  for st. Note that the decision maker for the power plant only 
knows its own bidding quantity, q0,t, and price, p0,t; qi,t and pi,t of other 
bidders for ię  must be estimated by the decision maker using a 
priori knowledge. In this paper, the bid quantities and prices of other 
entities are presumed to be influenced by the settlement price, vt–1, 
and sold allowance, ut–1, of the last-quarter CO2 allowance auction. A 
similar state-choosing method is discussed for the electricity market 
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[22]. Thus, a state st in the tth quarter is denoted as follows:
 1 1( , , , )   Tt t t ts v u h t     (20)
where ht is considered as a state variable in Eq. (20), since holding 
account CO2 allowances should be sufficient (Eq. (17)) but not po-
tentially exceed the holding limit hl (Eq. (16)). Besides, we tend to 
maximize the discounted cumulative profit of the power plant in 
question within its lifetime; therefore, time t is set as a state entry 
so that the decision maker can take different actions in different pe-
riods of the power plant life cycle.
Supposing that the bidding quantity set and bid price set for 
each entity are i and i, respectively, the decision maker can then 
estimate the probability ț of any bidder choosing a possible bidding 
option, which is
 , ,( , , ) Pr( , | , , )      i i i t i i t i t i i i iț s p q q q p p s s q p   (21)
for any i ę . Note that, although an entity may choose its bid option 
differently in each quarter, the bid option sets for quantity and price 
(i.e., i and i) are time-invariant and are assumed to be unchanged 
for s. Subsequently, we construct the following Markov decision 
process. Under a specific state, st = s, the decision maker takes a pos-
sible action at = a. With the joint probability defined as
 ' ( , , )
 

ass i i
i
ț s p q   (22)
all the other bidders will choose their own bidding options as spec-
ified in Eq. (22), so that the next-quarter state st+1 = (vt, ut, ht+1, t+1) = Vƍ 
can be uniquely determined when taking action at = a. Furthermore, 
a reward, rt+1, is derived in terms of the state transition from st to st+1, 
based on Eq. (12)—that is, that
 1 ( , , )  t t t t tr P P c w v   (23)
Note that “reward” is the terminology defined under the frame-
work of the reinforcement learning (RL). Physically, the (t+1)th 
quarter reward, rt+1, is the power plant profit Pt (Eq. (12)) for the tth 
quarter. Since t is any time index, the decision maker can recursively 
obtain the finite-time horizon reward sequence as st, at, st+1, rt+1, at+1, 
st+2, rt+2, …, at+N–1, st+N, rt+N, namely, an episode of bidding and opera-
tion. The variable N represents the lifetime of the power plant with 
the MEA-based carbon capture process. For kę {0, 1, …, N–1}, the 
objective function can be constructed as
 
1
1
0
max ( ) max { | }  
 
  ¦ Nʌ kʌ t k tʌ ʌ kV s Ȗ r s s    (24)
subject to
 1 ( , , )     t k t k t k t kr P c w v     (25) 
 0,  dt k t k lh q h    (26)
 
 1 ( ) 0       tt k t k t k t kh h w e   (27)
where V ʌ(st) is the state-value function for state st under policy ʌ; rt+k+1 
is the reward when transiting from state st+k to st+k+1; Ȗ is the discount 
coefficient; and ʌ{·} is the expectation of a discounted reward se-
quence under the policy ʌ. For the decision maker, the probability of 
a stochastic policy is written as ʌ(st+k, at+k), where the probability of 
each action, at+k, should be determined under each state, st+k, in order 
to maximize the lifetime discounted cumulative profit. We consider a 
stochastic or soft policy, since the optimal policy should be explored 
by the RL-based Sarsa TD algorithm. In the end, the soft policy should 
be gradually changed into an applicable deterministic optimal policy. 
Eqs. (26) and (27) can be obtained from Eqs. (16) and (17), respectively.
3. The Sarsa TD algorithm: Introduction and implementation
The RL-based Sarsa TD algorithm is one applicable algorithm that 
can find the optimal policy or strategy of the problem defined in 
Section 2. Such an algorithm can be programed in Matlab®. We ap-
ply this method for the power plant profit maximization, since it 
has adaptive and model-free features. As a result, an initial optimal 
policy can be found automatically with respect to a modeled envi-
ronment in Section 2; further policy adjustment can be made when 
the agent for the decision-making of the power plant interacts with 
the real environment. The Sarsa TD algorithm requires less compu-
tation time than dynamic programming and has better convergence 
property than another basic RL algorithm called Q-learning [23]. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Sarsa TD algorithm often 
finds a worse policy if the tuning parameters, such as İ, are sched-
uled improperly. The parameter İis the probability of exploring the 
action set , which will be introduced later.
To design a Sarsa TD algorithm, we should define an optimal action- 
value function based on Eq. (24), which is
 
1
*
1
0
( , ) max ( , ) max { | , }S SS S J      ¦
N
k
t k t t
k
Q s a Q s a r s s a a   (28)
for all s ę   and a ę , where Q ʌ is denoted as the action-value func-
tion in terms of policy ʌ Therefore, the optimal policy is
 *
*arg max ( , ) 
a
a Q s a     (29)
 
The optimal action value Q *, nevertheless, is unknown if the op-
timal policy has not yet been obtained. According to Refs. [23,24], 
an action value function iteration method (Eq. (30)) can ensure that 
the action value function Qt+k+1(s, a) converges to Q ʌ(s, a) for infinite 
times of visits to all states s ę   and all actions a ę  with Nĺ. 
The iteration method is
 1( , ) ( , ) [ ( ' , ') ( , )]D J       t k t k t k t kQ s a Q s a r Q s a Q s a     (30)
where a should be an action derived from the current policy ʌ; Į is 
the learning rate. Supposing that an estimator of Q ʌ(s, a) based on 
Eq. (30) is Q ʌ(s, a), policy improvement is achieved through the fol-
lowing equations:
 ˆarg max ( , ) for    ʌ
a
a Q s a s     (31)
 ^1 / , if'( , ) / , if n a as a n a aH HS H    z     (32)
where a is the greedy action causing an improved policy ( , )ʌ' s a  com-
pared with ʌ(s, a); n
 
is the number of possible actions in action set 
; and İ is the probability of choosing any action in the action set  
uniformly. All the actions except for the greedy one are called ex-
ploratory actions. The exploratory actions can ensure the finding of 
the optimal policy that causes global maximum state values, V ʌ (Eq. 
(24)), in each state, rather than some local maximums. By setting 
the new policy as ʌĸʌƍ Eqs. (30), (31), and (32) form the action val-
ue iteration algorithm that should be repeated forever. This algorithm 
can obtain the optimal policy, ʌ*. Before using this algorithm, both 
Į and İ should be scheduled. The learning rate, Į, should be large to 
ensure fast initialization of Q(s, a) (Eq. (30)) for all s ę   and all a ę 
, but eventually small to make those action values convergent. Al-
though theoretical conditions exist for the scheduled Į sequence, they 
are seldom used in applications [23]. The probability, İ, of exploring 
the action set is equal to one for a fully exploratory start, but gradual-
ly decreases to zero for the final derivation of a deterministic policy. 
Table 5 presents the Sarsa TD algorithm with the İ-greedy policy.
Note that the Sarsa TD algorithm is a model-free online algorithm 
that can be implemented directly through interaction with the en-
vironment, that is, the real CO2 allowance market. Nonetheless, in 
this paper, the estimation of bidding options and the corresponding 
probabilities for other entities are required to form a modeled CO2 
allowance market. Such a priori knowledge can be obtained from 
the historical bidding data of other power plants. If the historical 
bidding data are unavailable, historical market conditions can be 
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used to identify the state transition probability using statistical 
analysis [22]. On this basis, one can obtain an initial policy using the 
RL-based Sarsa TD algorithm provided in Table 5. The benefit is that 
fewer interactions are necessary with the real CO2 auction market. A 
unified planning and learning view is discussed in Ref. [23], which 
combines the simulated model and the real environment.
4. Results and discussion
In the case studies, there are eight covered entities labeled with 
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Entity 0 is the decision maker operating the 
coal-fired power plant with parameters shown in Table 4; this is 
assumed as our own company, which tends to maximize the dis-
counted cumulative profit of a power plant. The decision maker will 
implement the Sarsa TD algorithm, seeking the proper bidding and 
operation action in each state. Entity 1 operates a power plant with 
identical settings as those of Entity 0, but employs a different bid-
ding and operation strategy that will be further discussed in Section 
4.3. The bidding strategies of all the other entities (i.e., Entities 2–7) 
are predefined and are supposed to be predicted by a modeled en-
vironment of the decision maker. For the objective function shown 
in Eq. (24), the initial time step is set as t = 0 and the relevant time 
horizon is N = 100 quarters (i.e., the lifetime of the power plant is 
25 years), which indicates that kę{0, 1, 2, …, 99} Thus, any time- 
variant variable is now indexed by “k”, such as sk, ak, and rk+1. The 
annual discount rate is set to be 8% [9] for a power plant with a 
25-year lifetime, so the quarterly discount rate is derived to be Ȗ= 
1/(1 + 8%)0.25 ≈ 0.98. The holding limit, hl, is formulated based on the 
annual allowance budget [11]. Nevertheless, the annual allowance 
budget is scheduled and may be different for each year. For brevity, 
hl is a constant, with 6 × 106 allowances in this paper. In Table 5, Ȗ is 
8 episodes, Į is changed from 1/20 to 1/200, and İ is varied from 1 to 
0.1. The variables Į and İ are changed following the execution of the 
policy improvement.
The state variables in Eq. (20) should be aggregated into discrete 
levels to ease the curse of dimensionality for the state space; this 
is called state aggregation [22,23]. State aggregation is achieved as 
follows: The settlement price and sold allowances are considered 
together, since when one is in a specific domain, the other should be 
constrained in some specific value. For example, if the sold allow-
ances, uk–1, in the CO2 auction are smaller than the total auctioned CO2 
allowances, A = 1 500 000 allowances, then the settlement price, vk–1, 
must be equal to the reserve price, g, which is indicated by the levels 
of is = 1, 2, 3 in Table 6. Similarly, the time, k, and the holding account 
CO2 allowances, hk, are aggregated separately and are summarized 
in Table 6 and Table 7, respectively. Based on Table 6 and Table 7, the 
original state space   is discretized into 8 × 5 × 14 = 560 aggregated 
states. The action variables (Eq. (19)) are sorted into two parts. One 
is the operation part, that is, five possible CO2 capture levels of the 
coal-fired power plant for the decision maker, which are ={50%, 
60%, 70%, 80%, 90%} in Table 3; the other part is 16 possible bid op-
tions, including both the bid quantities and prices, that is, (q0, p0) 
ę0. Analogously to the bid quantity sets and the bid price sets of 
other entities (i.e., i and i), we only consider the time-invariant 
bid option set, 0, independent of the states. Hence, there are a total 
of 5 × 16 = 80 different actions for each aggregated state of the deci-
sion maker. We will mention the specific action once it is applied by 
the decision maker in the following sections. The exact 80 actions 
due to  and 0 are not listed, for brevity.
4.1. Convergence of the Sarsa TD algorithm
In this section, we present the convergence characteristic for an 
action value in some state. Note that since the state variables have 
been aggregated, we only consider the classified levels labeled in 
Table 6 and Table 7 for each state entry, rather than the exact values 
of sk for k. Fig. 2 shows the convergence of the action value Q(s, a) 
for one certain state-action pair (s, a), where the aggregated state, 
s, is classified into a triplet (is, js, vs) = (5, 7, 4) and the action, a, is in-
dexed by ia = 61. For the action indexed by ia = 61, the corresponding 
action is a = (300 000, 14.5, 27), specified in a predefined discrete 
action set . The final value of this state-action pair is an estimation 
of the optimal Q*(s, a). As discussed, there are a total of 80 action 
values for one state, displayed in Fig. 3. Based on the action values, 
we can show that the action index ia = 61 gives the maximum Q val-
ue and is the best action in this state. Thus, the optimal policy can 
be found by searching for the action with the maximum action value 
for each aggregated state.
Table 5
The RL-based Sarsa TD algorithm with the ɂ-greedy policy.
Input Discount coefficient Ȗ; scheduled İ and Į; arbitrary policy ʌ
Initialization Initialize Q(s, a) for all s ę  , all a ę 
For each policy improvement
     For every episode ȝ
          Initialize s, choose a for state s with the İ-greedy policy ʌ
          For each step of an episode
               Take action a and observe r, Vƍ
               Choose Dƍfor state Vƍwith the İ-greedy policy ʌ
               Q(s, a) ĕ Q(s, a) + Į[r + Ȗ4(Vƍ, Dƍ) – Q(s, a)]
               VĸVƍ, DĸDƍ
          End for
     End for
     Q^ʌ(s, a)ĕ Q(s, a)
 
for all s ę  and all a ę 
     Policy improvement:
          Apply Eqs. (31) and (32); ʌĸʌƍfor all s ę   and all a ę 
          Scheduled parameter update: İ, Į
End for
Table 6
Levels for the settlement price and sold allowance pair (vk–1, uk–1) and levels for the 
time k.
Level is vk–1 domain uk–1 domain Level vs k domain
1 vk–1 = g [0, 0.5A) 1 {0, 2, ..., 24}
2 vk–1 = g [0.5A, 0.8A) 2 {25, 26, ..., 49}
3 vk–1 = g [0.8A, 1.0A) 3 {50, 51, ..., 74}
4 (1.0g, 1.1g) ut = A 4 {75, 76, ..., 99}
5 [1.1g, 1.2g) ut = A 5 k = 100
6 [1.2g, 1.3g) ut = A
7 [1.3g, 1.4g) ut = A
8 [1.4g ut = A
Table 7
Levels for the holding account CO2 allowances, hk.
Level js hk domain (× 1000) Level js hk domain (× 1000)
1 [0, 64] 8 (2050, 3050]
2 (64, 129] 9 (3050, 4050]
3 (129, 193] 10 (4050, 5050]
4 (193, 258] 11 (5050, 5700]
5 (258, 322] 12 (5700, 5750]
6 (322, 1050] 13 (5750, 5850]
7 (1050, 2050] 14 (5850, 6000]
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4.2. Performance of the Sarsa TD algorithm
In this section, we show that the Sarsa TD algorithm with a 
time-varying flexible CO2 capture level can earn more discounted 
cumulative profit within the whole time horizon compared with the 
operation method using the fixed capture level that is specified in 
most of the relevant literature. The initial reserve price at time k = 0 
is 12.73 USD per allowance [11]. In addition, an annual reserve price 
increase rate, Ĳ, is introduced to increase the reserve price annually. 
This annual reserve price increase rate can simulate the development 
of novel technologies on carbon capture and storage. One settlement 
price example is shown in Fig. 4. It is observable that the settlement 
price is volatile during the entire time horizon (i.e., 100 quarters), 
and has a scheduled increase due to the annual increase rate of 5%. 
The same increase rate is set for the California and Quebec joint 
greenhouse gas auction [11,14].
To exhibit the adaptability of the Sarsa TD algorithm, the sched-
uled annual increase rate, Ĳ, is assumed to be 0%, 5%, 10%, and 15% 
for the CO2 allowance reserve price. If one specific annual increase 
rate is fixed at Ĳ = 0%, as shown in Fig. 5, except for the curve for 
the competitor (i.e., Entity 1), four reward sequences are shown for 
different bidding and operation strategies chosen by the decision 
maker of Entity 0. One bidding and operation strategy is found 
by the Sarsa TD algorithm with a time-varying capture level. The 
other strategies choose the fixed-capture-level-based operation 
(i.e., with the capture level set at 50%, 70%, or 90% throughout the 
relevant episode) and decide on the bid option with the prede-
fined probabilities for each action under each aggregated state. 
Possible bid options for the fixed-capture-level-based strategy also 
come from the bid option set, 0, which is the same as that of the 
Sarsa-based unified bidding and operation strategy. Note that the 
aforementioned reward sequences indicate the quarter-based prof-
its of the power plant throughout its lifetime. By computing the 
discounted sum of a specific reward sequence, one can obtain the 
discounted cumulative profit of a specific bidding and operation 
strategy. Based on Fig. 5, the discounted cumulative profit with the 
annual reserve price increase rate, Ĳ, of 0% can be calculated for 
each strategy.
Analogously, as shown in Fig. 6–Fig. 8, one can obtain the dis-
counted cumulative profits with the initial holding account CO2 
allowances h0 = 0.05 × 106 and with Ĳ changing from 5% to 15%. The 
discounted cumulative profits for different reserve price increase 
rates under specific initial holding account CO2 allowances h0 = 0.05 
× 106 are shown in Fig. 9.
Furthermore, the discounted cumulative profits for other initial 
holding account CO2 allowances are presented in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11. 
It can be implied that whatever fixed capture level may be set by 
the decision maker using the fixed-capture-level-based method, the 
unified flexible operation and bidding strategy found by the Sarsa 
TD performs better.
Fig. 2. Convergence of a typical state-action pair with 
the state is = 5, js = 7, vs = 4, and ia = 61.
Fig. 3. Action values of a specific state is = 5, js = 7, and 
vs = 4 for all possible actions.
Fig. 4. Settlement prices for an annual increase rate of 
Ĳ= 5% and an initial reserve price of g = 12.73 USD per 
allowance.
Fig. 5. Rewards for different bidding and operation strategies with an annual increase 
rate of Ĳ= 0% and the initial holding account CO2 allowance of h0 = 0.05 × 106.
Fig. 6. Rewards for different bidding and operation strategies with an annual increase 
rate of Ĳ= 5% and the initial holding account CO2 allowance of h0 = 0.05 × 106.
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4.3. Comparison with another entity in the allowance market
We consider the performance of the Sarsa TD algorithm for the 
decision maker compared with a competitor, Entity 1, in the same 
CO2 allowance market. For this competitor, all settings of the power 
plant are assumed to be the same as those for Entity 0. Regarding 
the operation and bidding method, Entity 1 has its capture level 
fixed at 60% while it independently selects the bid option from 0, 
the same as Entity 0. It is assumed that the bid option selection be-
havior of Entity 1 is approximated with the Boltzmann distribution 
by the decision maker of Entity 0, as follows:
  
 1
Pr( ) exp[ ( ) / ] / exp[ ( ) / ]
bn
z
y Ȧ y ȟ Ȧ z ȟ
 
 ¦
  
(33)
where y and z are the indices of the available bidding options; nb is 
the total number of bid options that is equal to 16 for the bid option 
set 0; Pr(y) denotes the probability of choosing the bid option with 
an index of y; and ȟ is the temperature of the distribution. From Eq. 
(33), a large ȟ indicates that the selection of each possible bid option 
is nearly equiprobable. For simplicity, ȟ= 1 in this case study. The 
variable Ȧ represents the weightings for each option indexed by y or 
z. In our simulation, the maximum among all weightings is a con-
stant, Ȧmax = nb. It is assumed that the 13th bid option is assigned with 
the maximum weighting, that is, Ȧ(y = 13) = Ȧmax = 16. Weightings 
of all the possible bidding options are decreased by 1 per index cen-
tered at y = 13. Thus, all the weightings are specified and listed as 
follows: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 15, 14, 13. With these 
weightings, the probability of choosing one possible bid option can 
be predefined in terms of Eq. (33). In practice, the decision maker 
can obtain either the historical bidding data of this competitor or 
the historical market conditions to identify weightings.
In Fig. 12 and Fig. 13, the holding account CO2 allowances of the 
decision maker, hk, and those of the competitor are plotted, respec-
tively. The discounted cumulative profits of both entities are shown 
in Fig. 14, which is derived with reward sequences from Fig. 5 to Fig. 8 
for the decision maker applying the Sarsa TD algorithm and for the 
competitor. In Fig. 14, the decision maker gains more discounted 
cumulative rewards for different annual increase rates of the reserve 
price, which suggests that a better bidding and operation strategy 
through the Sarsa TD algorithm is applied by the decision maker 
than the strategy implemented by the competitor in the same CO2 
allowance market.
5. Conclusions
A unified bidding and operation strategy found by the Sarsa TD 
algorithm is presented for a coal-fired power plant with carbon 
Fig. 8. Rewards for different bidding and operation strategies with an annual increase 
rate of Ĳ= 15% and the initial holding account CO2 allowance of h0 = 0.05 × 106.
Fig. 11. Discounted cumulative profits with the initial 
holding account CO2 allowance of h0 = 5 × 106 and the 
initial reserve price g0 = 12.73 USD per allowance.
Fig. 9. Discounted cumulative profits with the initial 
holding account CO2 allowance of h0 = 0.05 × 106 and the 
initial reserve price g0 = 12.73 USD per allowance.
Fig. 10. Discounted cumulative profits with the initial 
holding account CO2 allowance of h0 = 3 × 106 and the 
initial reserve price g0 = 12.73 USD per allowance.
Fig. 7. Rewards for different bidding and operation strategies with an annual increase 
rate of Ĳ= 10% and the initial holding account CO2 allowance of h0 = 0.05 × 106.
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Fig. 14. Discounted cumulative profits of the decision 
maker, Entity 0, and of Entity 1, both with the initial 
holding account CO2 allowance of h0= 0.05 × 106.
Fig. 12. Decision-maker holding account CO2 allowances 
using the Sarsa TD strategy for different reserve price in-
crease rates.
Fig. 13. Competitor holding account CO2 allowances for 
different reserve price increase rates.
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capture. It is demonstrated that the proposed strategy, using a 
time-varying flexible CO2 capture level from the capture level set and 
a bidding option set, is better than a fixed-capture-level-based op-
eration with an independently designed bidding strategy. The Sarsa 
TD algorithm can maximize the discounted cumulative profit for the 
power plant under different CO2 allowance market conditions, such 
as a different annual increase rate of the reserve price or different 
initial holding account CO2 allowances. Furthermore, compared with 
another power plant with a fixed capture level and a randomly de-
signed bidding strategy using the Boltzmann distribution, the deci-
sion maker implementing the strategy from the Sarsa TD algorithm 
is more competitive in the CO2 allowance market.
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